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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Third 
District Court granting a decree of specific performance of a 
contract to plaintiff Property Assistance Corporation. The 
case is before this Court by assignment from the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Must an option be exercised in strict compliance 
with its express terms before a bilateral contract, capable 
of being specifically performed, comes into existence? 
2. Is a party sho pays a debt of another, voluntarily 
and without request, entitled to recover the amount of such 
payment from the debtor? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISION 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is 
determinative of the issues presented by this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought this action seeking specific 
performance of an "option agreement". Defendants moved to 
dismiss the complaint on the ground that having failed to plead 
compliance with the terms of the option, plaintiff hadn't stated 
a cognizible claim for specific performance. Though this motion 
was denied, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint eliminating 
any reference to an option and seeking either specific per-
formance in contract or, in the alternative, damages for its 
breach. The parties made cross motions for summary judgment 
which were both denied. 
The matter was tried to the Court on June 16, 1987. 
Following the trial, which consisted of the testimony of a 
single witness, the Court below entered the judgment from which 
this appeal was taken. 
The material facts relating to this matter have never 
been in dispute. Mr. William Oelerich, president and sole 
shareholder of the corporate plaintiff, approached the Roberts 
in January of 1986 with an offer relating to the possible purchase 
of their home in Sandy, Utah, by Property Assistance. (R. 155, 
transcript at pg. 13). Mr. Oelerich, whose business involved 
obtaining equity in real property subject to foreclosure 
proceedings, obtained the Roberts name from a Notice of Trustee's 
Sale published in one of the newspapers. (See exhibit no. 1-P). 
Following some negotiations, on February 2, 1987, Mr. and Mrs. 
Roberts granted Property Assistance an option to purchase their 
home. (See exhibit 2-P). The option granted was to expire in 
seven days. On the 7th of February the Roberts executed a 
written extension of the option until February 26, 1987. (See 
exhibit 7-P). 
During the period between February 2nd and February 
26th, Mr. Oelerich entered into negotiations with Tracy Collins 
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Bankf the holder of the second Deed of Trust who had given 
the notice of sale of the property which first drew his 
attention. Mr. Oelerich arranged to have the Trusteefs sale 
postponed. (R.163, trans, at 21; exhibit 4-P). In fact, on 
February 21, 1987, he completely paid off the $40,069.87 
balance on the note held by Tracy Collins. (R.165, trans, 
at 23, exhibits 9-P, 10-P). At the time this payment was made 
Mr. Oelerich did not seek or receive approval of the payment 
from the Roberts and had no agreement with them that they would 
reimburse the money so paid in the event he failed to exercise 
the Property Assistance option. (R.176, trans, at 34-36). 
On Febraury 26th, Mr. Oelerich met with the Roberts 
at their home and requested an extension of the option. The 
Roberts declined. Mr. Oelerich left without exercising his 
option in accordance with its terms and the option expired on 
February 26, 1987. (R.181, trans, at 29,34,39). 
The option form used by the parties originated with 
plaintiff and Mr. Oelerich provided its non-standardized terms. 
(R.175, trans. 33-34). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. An option must be exercised in strict conformity 
with its express terms before any bilateral contract, capable 
of specific performance, comes into existence. The option 
granted the plaintiff in this case required that it be exercised 
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in writing. As this was never done, by the plaintiff's own 
admission, the option expired and no contract of sale was ever 
entered into by the parties. Accordingly, the trial Court's 
entry of a judgment decreeing specific performance was the 
product of an error of law. 
2. The Court below committed prejudicial error when 
it entered findings of fact which were totally inconsistent 
with the evidence. In finding that the parties entered into 
an "earnest money agreement" the Court failed to give credence 
to the unambigious terms of the written option in question and 
found a different agreement to have been made although no 
testimony or evidence supported such a finding. 
3. A party who pays an obligation of another, volun-
tarily and without request, is not entitled to recover those 
payments made for the benefit of the debtor. Therefore, upon 
remand the Court below should be instructed to enter a judgment 
of no cause of action on the plaintifffs complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO EXERCISE 
ITS OPTION IN STRICT CONFORMITY 
WITH ITS TERMS IS A BAR TO ANY 
ACTION SEEKING SPECIFIC PERFOR-
MANCE. 
It is a fundamental and universal rule of law that 
options must be exercised in strict compliance with their express 
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terms. This rule of law was relied upon by the Utah Supreme 
Court to deny specific performance in Nance v. Schoonover, 521 
P.2d 896 (Utah 1974). The plaintiffs in that action held an option 
to purchase real property which required tender of $17,000.00 
in cash. The plaintiffs timely notified the defendants that 
they desired to exercise the option and would tender a personal 
check for the payment required. After being notified that such 
a tender was unacceptable they sued for specific performance 
of the terms agreement that they had an option to accept. The 
Supreme Court, in affirming the dismissal of the action, reiter-
ated the rule of law in this state that options can only be 
exercised in strict compliance with their express terms. 
It is the plaintiff's contention 
that their tender of a personal check 
was sufficient to exercise the option 
and further that their tender in their 
complaint is sufficient tender to 
entitle them to specific performance. 
We are of the opinion that the Court's 
finding that the option had not been 
exercised in the period specified 
in the option must be upheld. This 
court has long adhered to the rule 
that an option must be exercised in 
accordance with its terms. 
521 P.2d at 897; See also, Equitable Realty, Inc. v. Nielson, 
30 Utah 2d 433, 519 P.2d 243 (1974). 
In the instant case, plaintiff did not allege, and 
did not in fact achieve, compliance with the agreement's require-
ment of written notice of the exercise of the option. Such a failure 
deprives plaintiff of any rights whatsoever under the agreement. 
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As the Court noted in Cillesson v. Kona Company, 73 N.M. 297, 
387 P.2d 867 (1964) : 
In an option contract, with the 
requirement of its exercise in 
writing, the rule is that its 
terms must be fully and completely 
accepted in all parts, and its 
provisions strictly complied with, 
before it becomes an executory 
contract. 
387 P.2d at 870. 
Failure to give written notice, when so required by 
an option agreement, is not excused by conduct or actions which 
expressly or impliedly manifest an intent to exercise the option. 
In T.W. Anderson Mortgage Co. v. Robert Land Co., 480 P.2d 109 
(Colo.App. 1970), the Court acknowledged the rule that the only 
way an option holder can satisfy a requirement of giving written 
notice, and thereby obtain further rights by virtue of the 
option, is by giving written notice. 
In the present case, the buyer 
did not give to the owners the 
written notice of the exercise 
of the option as required by 
the plain and unequivocal terms 
of the contract. The buyer's 
oral notice did not comply with 
the terms of the contract and 
was inneffectual. 
480 P.2d at 110. 
As plaintiff has not established its own strict compliance 
with the terms of the option agreement (and, in fact, conceded, 
it did not comply with its terms), the complaint for specific 
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performance should have been dismissed and judgment for defendants 
entered. 
POINT II 
THE JUDGMENT ENTERED BELOW IS 
INCONSISTENT WITH THE UNDISPUTED 
EVIDENCE OFFERED AT TRIAL. 
When the present action was filed, plaintiff referred 
to its "option agreement" and sought a decree of specific 
performance based upon its substantial compliance with the 
terms of the option. After being confronted with the unequivocal 
law denying relief in cases asserting substantial compliance 
with options, plaintiff amended its complaint and alleged it 
didn't have an option at all, but an enforceable bilateral 
agreement. 
In an effort to avoid the consequence of its failure 
to exercise its option as required by its own contract, plaintiff 
asserted that the agreement in question wasn't a "typical" 
option contract. This assertion was both irrelevant and untrue. 
While the terms of the purchase contract which plaintiff had the 
option to render binding were somewhat unique, the option itself 
was simple and entirely typical. For a stated consideration the 
plaintiff received the option to purchase a piece of real 
property upon providing written notice of the exercise of the 
option. It failed to give notice within the applicable period 
and the option expired by its own terms. The option having 
expired, there was simply no agreement which can be "specifically 
performed." 
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Pointing to the unusual terms of the agreement which 
never ripened into a binding contract as an excuse for failing 
to take the action which would have given life to that very 
agreement is pure sophistry. The terms of the purchase agreement 
are entirely immaterial because the option was never exercised 
as required by law. 
In an effort to avoid the obvious law applicable to 
this action plaintiff contended that the option agreement wasn't 
an option agreement. This suggestion, which is inconsistent 
with the allegations of the initial complaint in this action, 
is also completely inconsistent with the clear, unambiguous 
terms of the agreement. It is axiomatic that 
In construing a document, courts 
may not rewrite the provisions there-
of, but must enforce an unambiguous 
contract in accordance with its terms. 
Griffin v. United Bank of Denver, 599 P.2d 866, 868 (Colo. 
1979) . Or, as expressed by the Utah Supreme Court, " [a] court 
will not rewrite an unambiguous contract." Provo City Corp. v. 
Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979). 
The term option is unambiguous. A party cannot alter 
the clear meaning of the term by simply asserting a differing 
view of what he believes the contract should mean. As stated 
in Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980); 
Where possible, the underlying intent 
of a contract is to be gleaned from 
the language of the instrument 
itself; only where the language is 
uncertain or ambiguous need extrinsic 
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evidence be resorted to. No such 
ambiguity is present in this case, 
nor was it asserted. Also, the mere 
fact that parties urge diverse 
definitions of contract terminology 
does not, per se, render it ambiguous. 
605 P.2d at 1251. 
Defendants respectfully submit that the Court below 
impermissably rewrote the unambiguous agreement of the parties 
to incorporate terms which were absent from their contract. 
In fact, the agreement signed by the parties isn't a bilateral 
agreement at all. Like all options it merely constituted an 
offer to make a contract which was irrevocable during a specified 
period. However, when not effectively exercised during the 
period, the option expired and the underlying proposed agreement 
for purchase and sale never came into existence. Obviously, 
therefore, it cannot be specifically performed. 
While the Court concluded that the parties1 "agreement 
is not 'true option', but the equivalent of an earnest money 
receipt and offer to purchase . . .," there was absolutely 
no testimony to support such a conclusion. The Roberts' never 
agreed to waive the requirement of written exercise of the option 
and expressly refused to extend the option. The mere fact 
that plaintiff was apparently laboring under a mistaken 
assumption of the legal effect of the written option he was 
granted cannot be the basis for according him contract rights 
or excusing his failure to exercise the option. Waiver of the 
express terms of an option requires an express agreement. 
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Equitable Realty, Inc. v. Nielson, 30 Utah 2d 433, 519 P.2d 
242 (1974). 
While the plaintiff has suggested that the Roberts 
agreed to have a single "closing" and that this somehow 
obviated the need for its exercise of the option, there is nothing 
at all in the testimony which would support the conclusion that 
agreeing to delay a "closing" constituted an express agreement 
to waive written exercise of the option. A "closing", as that 
term is generally used in real estate transactions, is nothing 
more than a meeting at which the parties simultaneously perform 
pursuant to the terms of their contract. In the absence of an 
enforceable contract, no "closing" ever occurs. 
It is manifest that the Court below, upon invitation 
of the plaintiff, rendered a conclusion of law which was not 
supported by the evidence in an effort to achieve what he felt 
would be a just result. However, a court is not free to dis-
regard the evidence and the applicable rules of law to shape 
the relief he or she feels to be most fair under the circumstances. 
As the plaintiff was the author of the option in dispute it 
must be strictly construed against him. Sandberg v. Klien, 
576 P.2d 129 (Utah 1978). He cannot now request the courts 
to make an agreement for him he did not make for himself. 
Accordingly, the judgment below must be reversed. 
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POINT III 
PLAINTIFF HAS NO ENTITLEMENT 
TO BE REIMBURSED FOR PAYMENTS 
MADE VOLUNTARILY AND WITHOUT 
REQUEST BY DEFENDANTS. 
During the option period plaintiff made a payment 
beneficial to the property but without request by the defendants. 
Plaintiff now seeks relief from the effects of this unilateral 
action claiming "unjust" enrichment. 
The contention that a person whose property has been 
encumbered by virtue of the voluntary payment of another owes 
a duty of restitution to the payor, though logically plausible, 
cannot withstand scrutiny. The law has long recognized that a 
person who, without coercion or request, unconditionally confers 
a benefit upon another is not entitled to restitution. See 
Restatement, Restitution, §112 (1937). While at first blush 
such a rule seems to countenance a form of "unjust enrichment", 
it has been noted that while such a payment does benefit the 
debtor there is nothing unjust about allowing that person to 
retain the benefit conferred because the payor has no right 
to expect legal protection when intermedling in someone else's 
affairs. As noted in the Restatement, 
where a person has officiously 
conferred a benefit upon another, 
the other is enriched but is not 
considered to be unjustly enriched. 
Id. at §2, pg. 16. 
Two illustrations are offered to demonstrate the general 
application of this rule. 
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1. Being pressed for money, A fails 
to pay bills owed by him and B, 
a friend, pays the amout of such 
bills to the creditor, in order 
to protect A's good name. B is not 
entitled to restitution from A, 
even though upon paying the bills 
he believed himself entitled to 
reimbursement, intended to claim 
it and, had he received an assignment 
from the creditors, he could have 
obtained it. 
3. During A's absence and in the 
belief that A will be willing to 
pay for the work, B improves A's 
land, which is worth and is offered 
for sale at $5,000.00 to such an 
extent that upon A's return he sells 
the land for $8,000.00. B is not 
entitled to restitution from A. 
Restatement, Restitution, §112 at pg. 462. 
An individual who voluntarily makes mortgage payments 
on property, prior to the time when he has any legal interest 
in the property, is not entitled to be reimbursed for such payments 
by the land owner. See Brusco v. Brusco, 407 P.2d 645 (Ore. 1965). 
The same has been held to be true of one who pays property taxes 
and assessments despite the lack of title. As the Court noted 
in Shumway v. Early, 56 Ariz. 126, 106 P.2d 194 (1940), relief 
must be denied because 
[i]t is well settled law that one 
who voluntarily pays the debt or 
obligation of another, when under 
no duty to do so, may not recover 
his outlay. 
106 P.2d at 196. See also, McNalty v. Capp, 126 Cal.App. 2d 
697, 271 P.2d 90 (1954). 
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While occasionally overlooked, the requirement of 
establishing "unjust" enrichment is a predicate to restitution 
and simply proving that a benefit has been conferred doesn't 
meet this burden. In Tabata v. Murame, 24 Cal.2d 221, 148 P.2d 
605 (1944), the California Supreme Court set aside a jury verdict 
entered after the trial court erroneously instructed the jury 
that the plaintiff only need establish that a benefit was 
conferred to demonstrate an entitlement to a quantum meruit 
recovery. 
There can be no recovery for 
voluntary payment of a debt of a 
third party without request and 
with no promise of repayment. 
148 P.2d 607. The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized that 
not every benefit bestowed carries with it an obligation for 
payment. See, generally, Commercial Fixtures & Furnishings, Inc. 
v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773 (Utah 1977)1 Kershaw v. Tracy Collins Bank 
& Trust, 561 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977). 
While it is true that denying Property Assistance Corp-
oration restitution will, in effect, work a forfeiture of all 
payments it made during the period of its option, it has been 
recognized that "option contracts do not come within the equitable 
rule against forfeiture . . . " Cillessen v. Kona Co., 387 
P.2d 867, 870 (N.M. 1963). 
CONCLUSION 
Having failed to exercise its option in conformity 
with its express terms, plaintiff forfeited any contractual 
-13-
rights it might have obtained had it exercised the option. 
This fact requires reversal of the decree of specific 
performance entered below. Upon remand, the Court below 
should be instructed to enter judgment for the defendant as the 
alternative claim for unjust enrichment is not supported by 
the evidence which demonstrates a voluntary and unrequested 
payment was made for which equity provides no relief. 
DATED this day of December, 1987. 
M. David Eckersley 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that 4 true and correct copies of 
the foregoing were mailed this day of December, 1987, to 
the following: 
Ellen Maycock 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
HOUPT & ECKERSLEY 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit 1 Option 
Exhibit 2 Extension of Option 
Exhibit 3 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
HKDE THIS 2nd day of February 
J9 86 , Between Qpuglas C. and Betty J . Roberts , party 
of the Ftrtt Part, hereinafter celled the'Set'crm and Property A s s i s t a n c e C o r p . , pa r 
of the Second peri, hereinafter colled the 'Buyer ' 
I2HltTlf*ttt1j, That in conmderatujn of I 2 0 0 0 , 0 0 'o the Se 
In hand pc\d by the Buyer, receipt whereof is herehy acknowledged the said Seller hereby vants 
the Buyer the right and <yptwn to purchase uithtn 7 Jays from Out djte herecf Ail 
of Lot 71, WiLlow Stream Estates t 5, accordin to the 
official plat thereof on file and of record ?n#the office 
of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, State of Ltah, 
hereinafter called "8021 Erique Way'\ 
If the Buyer denres to exercise the said option c\d shall, u,n/im 'he said period so notify 
Seller m writing, which notice may be served persunelly upon the Seller 01 lift at the Sr" rs <' ieV 
house or usual place of abode or be sent by mail, tuldressed thereto, withm ruch period, thu cation ^ 
then become a binding agreement upon the parties hereto for the sale and purchase of the *ul hi 
end premises under the following conditions 
1 The price for the said property shall be the sum of I 2 0 0 0 . 0 0 p i US S e e $ 1 
of which the amount poid for thus option shall be applied on account 
2 Settlement is to take place etKruse, Landi & Mavcock 620 Keirns Bldg 
1J6 S. Mam h u Salt L?ke City, Utah 
onthe 4 t h . day of February . 19 86,
 at 10:00 ockck \ 
which time is of the essence of this egreement, when the Seller shall deliver a 
warrar'y deed for the said premises, and the balance of *he purchase price it to be paid cr secured 
RuTer agrees to market for sale H021 Lrique Uay at a lair 
market price. Buyer agrees to pay t'> seller 23% of m»t 
ptolils ol anv sale buyer iccepts, pi>nmt mjde upon lfic 
closing of an} such sale. 
Buyer agrees to assume responsibility for tirst ind second 
mortgage obligations. Seller is obligated to have first 
mortgage payments current through January 31, 10°(>. 
7 In the etent f the Buyer not making, settlement m u r 'dance i ith the tcr~u K 'Lof 
payment or payments male on account shall, at the Sellers option I* 'orfmted as liquuic*c i dj*na 
fcr the fa lure of the Bw *r to settle, or be applied on account of the purchase pnee 
4 The title to be delivered shad be a marketable title and shjtl he free and clear c( oh tncj 
br nces including munxcival liens end assesrments and liability j^r n stsrments for trrproiemcnts n 
icntfructfd (eicept as herein stated), this clawse to be operatu e as < / the (Ltc of thn a^ci^ent, a 
the title is to be subject to all etirttng restrictions of record, the Seder, heme er, guaruntees that tK 
are no restrictions in any conveyance or plans of record affecting th* said premises, which udl p 
hbit the use and/or occut*ncy thereof as Property A s s i s t a n c e Corp. 
and the premises shall be conveyed m the tame condition as the same now are, reasonable tear c 
tear excepted 
5 In the event that such title cannot he made hy the Seller as ' ove, and the Buyer u unanf/ 
to accept ruch title a* the Seller can make, then at Buyer's option, the above payment or pcyme 
ihall be returned to the Buyer, together with the reasonable expenses of eiammtng the tale and r~ak 
survey, or the Buyer may praeeaeee amy legal or equitable action to which the Buyer may be entitled. 
9 Actual possession is to Be given ta the Buyer on the day of settlement, except as herein stat 
If the Buyer accepts pctsrseton, w4th the SeUWs consent, before the im$ of settlement then the Se\ 
ikdl be allowed by a ay of idfustmeni, interest et 6% on the Lai ncc due from the lc:e of r mrr 
to the date of settlement 
7 T*x«4, water rtnts, intetese Oft incumbrances, ptcrper+y rentals and other current charges :* 
be adsusted as of the date of smtlrment, unlets posmesMon be given prior thereto, in which case ill n 
adfwrtmenU shall be made m of the de*e of delivery of pceeesMon 
9. The Seller shall r*f for the drevMg aj the deed end all revenue rtampt thereon, if any 
necessary, bui ell searches, tale tsmssrence end other conoeyemcisug npenset an to be paid for vy 
Buyer. 
EXHIBIT 1 
Le\)E&c&*f COMPACTS*, 0fSf/U'/&/££//Z4KJ<s>E/ D£APES 
£.*C<-vOE jZ£f:lZi6>£&tTCJZ-/}M0 FAH-U&tjT/=/x rcet 
io. Upon closing, seller agrees to occupy 8021 Erique 
Way as Tenant for buyer for a period of 90 days, or upon premises 
^ique Way. inis agreement cum-ingenL upun ^ L - — . . — L\ 
removal of exclusive listing and commission tor buyer. 
Ths wordi 'SELLER* and 'BUYErV in this agreement shall be construed to mean bo 
plural and lingular number and to mean net only the party thereby dmgruited, but also hit, , 
their rerpectne h*%n, erecutore or administrwton. or in the eirnt that either or bvth p4r\u>% ,}f 
potations, I/I or f.'unr mrceuort 
Ths said optusn ami th4 consequent agreement, if any, may be assigned by the Buyer wit 
written assent of ths Seller. 
Jn SHitrua* OTbtreof. fa pcrtkt hemo Wt hereunto $et . s i gnatures 
dated fa day ami yem first above written. 
SICNLD, llALXD KHQ MttJVUULO ^ .. 
DC THE P M n i N G i Of 1 ^ - ^ ^ f^^f^- • -y^cj^- \*~-^^OA^X<3 . . [i 
/(/< >»L.. A . f i ^ — / ^ [/ 
^JJSC&.... [L 
[L 
-\ " 
By 
For: PROPERTY ASSISTANCE CORP. 
EXTENSION OF OPTION 
Douglas C. and Betty J. Roberts, as one party, and Property 
Assistance Corporation, as the other party, hereby agree to an 
extension for exercise of option to purchase the property which 
is described in the attached Exhibit "A", until midnight on the 
<2£_ d*y of FF^£uA£\/ 1986. 
D a t e d t h i s ^ T day of FFB£V4£\J 
DCMiGLAS C . ROBERTS 
L 
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BETTY J / ROBERTS 
PROPERTY ASSISTANCE CORPORATION 
& 
W i l i i ^ r T f T S . O e l e r i c h 
E X H I B I T 2 
ELLEN MAYCOCK - 2131 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
620 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)531-7090 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PROPERTY ASSISTANCE CORP., ] 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS C. ROBERTS and 
BETTY J. ROBERTS, ) 
Defendants. ] 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
> CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C86-2125 
• Judge David S. Young 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial without a jury on June 16, 1987, 
pursuant to notice, the Honorable David S. Young presiding. Plaintiff Property 
Assistance Corp. was present through its president, William J. Oelerich, and was 
represented by counsel, Ellen Maycock, defendant Douglas C. Roberts was present in 
person and represented by counsel, M. David Eckersley, and defendant Betty J. 
Roberts was not present, but was represented by Mr. Eckersley. The court heard the 
testimony of William J. Oelerich and received exhibits and the parties rested. The 
court then heard the arguments of counsel. Based on the foregoing, the court now 
makes and enters the following: 
EXHIBIT 3 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff Property Assistance Corp. ("Property Assistance") is a Utah 
corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah. Property 
Assistance Corp. was incorporated in December of 1985. 
2. Defendants Douglas C. Roberts and Betty J. Roberts (the "Roberts") are 
residents of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
3. William J. Oelerich is the president of Property Assistance. 
4. On or about February 2, 1986, Property Assistance entered into an 
agreement, received in evidence herein as Exhibit 2-P, with the Roberts. The 
agreement concerned the Roberts residence at 8021 Erique Way, Sandy, Utah. On 
that same date, Property Assistance paid to the Roberts the sum of $2,000.00 as set 
forth in the agreement. 
5. At the time that the parties entered into the agreement, there were :wo 
obligations on the Roberts' home located at 8021 Erique Way in Sandy, Utah, 
secured by trust deeds; the first was in favor of First Federal Savings & Loan, and 
the second in favor of Tracy Collins Bank & Trust. The Roberts were in default with 
respect to the payments on the second trust deed obligation to Tracy Collins Bank & 
Trust and Tracy Collins had scheduled a trustee's sale for the property on 
February 5,1986. 
6. On February 5, 1986, Property Assistance entered into an agreement 
with Tracy Collins Bank & Trust, pursuant to which Property Assistance deposited 
$40,000 with Tracy Collins Bank & Trust and Tracy Collins Bank & Trust agreed to 
postpone its trustee's sale for 21 days. (Exhibit 4-P). 
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7. First Federal Savings, the holder of the first trust deed obligation, 
approved the assumption of the first trust deed obligation on the Roberts' residence 
by Property Assistance by letter dated February 4,1986. 
8. On February 10, 1986, Property Assistance entered into a listing 
agreement with Eagar & Company with respect to the sale of the property. 
9. On February 13, 1986, Property Assistance accepted an offer to purchase 
the property from Vicki and David Hill. The purchase price was $82,500.00. 
10. On February 7, 1986, the Roberts and Property Assistance entered into 
an agreement to extend the February 2,1986 agreement to February 26,1986. 
11. During February of 1986, William Oelerich, on behalf of Property 
Assistance, made the Roberts aware of all the steps he was taking with respect to the 
property, including the agreement with Tracy Collins, listing the property for sale, 
and acceptance of the offer to purchase the property. In addition, Mr. Oelerich 
discussed with the Roberts the desirability of avoiding two closings, that is, a 
conveyance of the property to Property Assistance and then a further conveyance of 
the property from Property Assistance to the purchasers, David and Vicki Hill. The 
Roberts indicated their assent to the avoidance of two closings. 
12. An additional agreement to extend the February 2, 1986 agreement to 
April 18, 1986 was signed by Property Assistance and by Betty Roberts but was not 
signed by Douglas Roberts. 
13. The February 2, 1986 agreement provided that the Roberts would pay 
rent of $800.00 per month to Property Assistance during the time they continued to 
reside in the property. The agreement further provided that a minimum payment of 
$500.00 per month toward rent with the balance of $300.00 per month to be deducted 
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by the proceeds of sale. On or about February 26,1986, the Roberts paid to Property 
Assistance the sum of $500.00 representing rent for the property at 8021 Erique Way 
for the month of February, 1986. On that same day, the Roberts informed Mr. 
Oelerich for the first time they would refuse to proceed with the terms of the 
February 2,1986 agreement. 
14. On February 21, 1986, the second trust deed in favor of Tracy Collins in 
the amount of $40,069.87, was paid in full by Property Assistance and Tracy Collins 
executed a full reconveyance of the property. 
15. On March 14, 1986, Property Assistance paid the first trust deed holder, 
First Federal Savings & Loan, the sum of $368.90 to bring the first trust deed on the 
property current. 
16. The Roberts have not paid any rent to Property Assistance since 
February 26, 1986, to the present. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The agreement dated February 2, 1986, between Property Assistance and 
the Roberts is clear and enforceable. That agreement is not a "true" option, but the 
equivalent of an earnest money receipt and offer to purchase which was accepted by 
the Roberts. The price of the property, pursuant to the agreement, is $40,069.37, 
plus the balance on the first trust deed to First Federal Savings & Loan, plus 
$2,000.00 previously paid to the Roberts, plus prejudgment interest at the rate of 
10% per annum from February 21,1986, to the date of sale of the property. 
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2. Property Assistance performed and honored all its obligations under the 
agreement and the Roberts unjustifiably refused to perform. 
3. Property Assistance is entitled to a decree of specific performance, 
enforcing the terms of the February 2,1986 agreement. Pursuant to that agreement, 
the Roberts should be ordered to convey title to the property to Property Assistance 
within 30 days. Property Assistance should then list the property for sale and sell it 
at a reasonable market value to be determined by Property Assistance. Property 
Assistance should then pay to the Roberts 25% of the net proceeds of sale. Net 
proceeds of sale are defined as follows: The sale price of the property less: 
(a) the amount of the first trust deed in favor of First Federal Savings & 
Loan; 
(b) $40,069.87; 
(c) $2,000.00; 
(d) interest at the rate of 10% per annum on $40,069.87 from February 
21, 1986, to the date of sale; and 
(e) any costs and expenses incurred in connection with the sale. 
The remainder, or 75% of the net proceeds of sale, is to be retained by Property 
Assistance. 
4. Pursuant to the agreement, the Roberts were required to pay to Property 
Assistance the sum of $800.00 per month as rent. The court finds that this rent is 
inherently reasonable and is approximately equivalent to the payment on the first 
trust deed plus the payment that the Roberts would otherwise have had to make on 
the second trust deed. The Roberts have made the first trust deed payment since 
March of 1986 and Property Assistance should not be entitled to any further credit 
-5-
for rent, nor should the Roberts be entitled for any credit for making the first trust 
deed payment. 
5. Based on the fact that Property Assistance accepted an offer to purchase 
the property in February of 1986, for $82,500.00, the court finds that, should 
defendants wish to appeal this matter, the amount of the supersedeas bond should be 
set at $85,000.00. 
6. Property Assistance should be entitled to recover its costs incurred herein 
which are as follows: 
Filing fee $ 50.00 
Recording fee: lis pendens 6.00 
Service fees 17.30 
Depositions: Roberts 112.60 
Total , $185.90 
DATED thi&A?—'day of June, 1987. 
BY THE COURT. 
JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG 
Approved as to form: 
M. DAVID ECKERSLEY 
Attorney for Defendants 
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